Proportionate Liability under the CBCA in the Context of Recent Corporate Governance Reform: Canadian Auditors in the Wrong Place at the Wrong Time? by Puri, Poonam & Ben-Ishai, Stephanie
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University 
Osgoode Digital Commons 
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship 
2004 
Proportionate Liability under the CBCA in the Context of Recent 
Corporate Governance Reform: Canadian Auditors in the Wrong 
Place at the Wrong Time? 
Poonam Puri 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, ppuri@osgoode.yorku.ca 
Stephanie Ben-Ishai 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, sbenishai@osgoode.yorku.ca 
Source Publication: 
Corporate Governance and Securities Regulation in the 21st Century. Toronto, ON: LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2004. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works 
 Part of the Accounting Law Commons, and the Business Organizations Law Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Puri, Poonam and Stephanie Ben-Ishai. "Proportionate Liability under the CBCA in the Context of Recent 
Corporate Governance Reform: Canadian Auditors in the Wrong Place at the Wrong Time?" Puri, Poonam, 
and Jeffrey Larsen, eds. Corporate Governance and Securities Regulation in the 21st Century. Toronto: 
LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2004. ISBN: 0433442921 
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of 
Osgoode Digital Commons. 
PROPORTIONATE LIABILITY UNDER THE CBCA IN THE
CONTEXT OF RECENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
REFORM: CANADIAN AUDITORS IN THE WRONG
PLACE AT THE WRONG TIME?
Poonam Puri* and Stephanie Ben-Ishai**
In the recent Canada Business Corporations Act' amendments
implementing a proportionate liability scheme, auditors appear to be
winners. This is consistent with the trend in the past several years as
a result of which Canadian auditors have been successful in nar-
rowing the scope of their liability both through legislation and
through common law. Going forward, however, it is fair to say that
auditors will be losers unless the accounting profession re-evaluates
its role and responsibilities to its stakeholders. Given the accounting
and corporate governance scandals North America has witnessed in
the past few years, as well as the actual and anticipated regulatory
response in Canada, the scope of auditor liability is bound to expand
once again. In addition to the recent creation of the Canadian Public
Accountability Board,2 auditors can expect to lose some aspects of
* Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. This is the revised
version of a paper presented at the 32nd Annual Consumer and Commercial Law Work-
shop held at the Faculty of Law of the University of Toronto on October 18 and 19, 2002.
Thanks are owed to Dina Chantzis for excellent research assistance.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School.
1. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44. Bill S-11, cl. 115, adding Part XIX.I (ss. 237.1 to 237.9) to the
CBCA.
2. On July 17, 2002, federal and provincial regulators and the accounting profession an-
nounced the creation of the Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) to administer
and enforce a new system to oversee the auditors of public companies in Canada. The
CPAB requirements will provide that Canadian chartered accountant (CA) firms in the
course of auditing public companies must accelerate the adoption of more stringent
standards on auditor independence, including limits on the types of consulting services
that can be provided to auditor clients; rotate the lead partner on an audit on a regular
basis; and require a second partner to review every audit. The CPAB will conduct inspec-
tions of auditors of public companies and will have the authority to levy sanctions against
auditors who fail to remedy significant deficiencies identified by the CPAB, and regulators
may take additional action as warranted. See Ontario Securities Commission, News
Release 02/17, "New Independent Public Oversight for Auditors of Public Companies
Announced by Federal and Provincial Regulators and Canada's Chartered Accountants"
(July 17, 2002).
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their self-regulatory status and be subject to greater direct regulatory
oversight.3
This article makes the case that the Canadian regulatory frame-
work is changing in two ways. First, following a reduction in
auditor liability, including the amendments creating a proportion-
ate liability scheme, we are once again seeing an expansion of that
liability. Second, coming from an era that mistrusted litigation as
a potential corporate governance mechanism, we are now recog-
nizing the benefits of litigation as a tool to ensure the accountabil-
ity of auditors, other professionals and corporate actors.
We argue that these are positive developments towards finding
a made-in-Canada response to the recent Enron-type corporate
governance scandals that have arisen in the United States. The loss
of high standards of transparency, independence and accountability
for auditors is part of the Enron saga that we may be able to avoid
in Canada. Indeed, it may be the case that we have not seen an
Enron-type scenario in this country because of our more principled
corporate culture, as compared with the American "loophole men-
tality". Nevertheless, it is equally true that, because we were slower
to narrow auditor liability than was the United States, the results
that could have occurred and did ensue there did not have time to
emerge in Canada.
This article first situates auditor liability in the context of the
role of the auditor in corporate governance, and in the context of
the role of liability as a corporate governance mechanism. Sec-
ondly, we focus on the legislative and judicial means through
which auditors have narrowed their liability in Canada. That por-
tion of the article will focus in particular on the CBCA amendments
changing the longstanding scheme of joint and several liability to
one of proportionate liability, which extends not only to auditors but
to other defendants for actions in relation to the CBCA. This article
3. The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants' Public Interest and Integrity Committee
recently published for comment proposed revised standards of independence governing
auditors that would either prohibit or place strict limits on auditors performing a range of
non-audit services for listed entities for which they are auditor; prohibit the lead partners
on an audit engagement team from providing audit services to the issuer for more than
five consecutive years; and prevent an accounting firm from auditing an issuer's financial
statements if certain members of management of that issuer had been members of the
accounting firm's audit engagement team within the one-year period preceding the
commencement of audit procedures. See proposed Independence Standards of the CICA,
s. 204, at <www.cica.ca> (last accessed March 24, 2002).
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will conclude by considering the recent American corporate gover-
nance scandals. We recount the dominant American position that
accounting practices and the role of the auditor were central to the
misconduct in the American corporate governance scandals and
analyze how the current and expected Canadian regulatory and
legislative response, with its focus on imposing liability, will make
auditors losers in the corporate governance arena.4
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Berle and Means' conclusions and concerns about the separation
of ownership and control in large publicly held corporations are as
relevant today as they were in 1932.5 The separation of ownership
and control causes concerns that managers will act in their own
interests rather than in the best interests of shareholders.6 In order
to reduce the divergence of interests between those who control
(managers) and those who own (shareholders), an array of legal
rules and market mechanisms are employed. Market mechanisms
include the market for corporate control and the market for manag-
ers. Mandatory legal rules, such as the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty, also act to reduce the divergence of interests between man-
agers and shareholders. In addition, liability rules and the threat of
shareholder litigation serve to reduce the divergence of interests
between managers and shareholders. Managers, directors and offi-
cers can be sued by investors and are personally liable for certain
corporate and securities law violations. Liability is imposed not
only on managers, but on a group of people often referred to as
gatekeepers,7 i.e. auditors, lawyers and underwriters, all of whom
4. This prediction was made by Paskell-Mede and Blackier four years ago. They predicted
that there will be less of a concern with "liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class" as auditors begin to take on new forms of
work and accordingly choose whether or not to engage in indeterminate liability. The
authors predicted that this will influence legislatures and the judiciary to expand liability
and while doing so they will be able to take comfort that the creation of measures such
as limited liability partnerships and developments in the area of proportionate liability
will meet the needs of auditors. See J. Blackier and M. Paskell-Mede, "Auditor Liability
in Canada: The Past, Present and Future" (1999), 48 U.N.B. L.J. 65 at p. 75.
5. A.A. Berle and G.C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York,
Commerce Clearing House, 1932), pp. 355-56.
6. See Poonam Puri, "Converging Numbers: Harmonization of Accounting Standards in the
Context of the Role of the Auditor in Corporate Governance", chapter in Queen's
Business Law Symposium: Impact of Globalization (Toronto, Carswell, 2002).
7. R.H. Kraakman, "Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls" (1984),
93 Yale L.J. 857; R.H. Kraakman, "Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third Party Enforce-
ment Strategy" (1986), 2 J.L.E.O. 53. See also J. Coffee, "Understanding Enron: 'It's
About the Gatekeepers, Stupid"' (2002), 57 Bus. Law. 1403.
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perform critical functions for a company that wishes to issue securi-
ties in the public capital markets. An issuer company must often use
the services of these gatekeepers to access public capital markets.
Underwriters are often necessary to assist in the distribution of
securities, and lawyers are often called upon to provide legal opin-
ions.
Auditors in particular play a specific role as gatekeepers to
access of public markets. Public companies are required by corpo-
rate and securities laws to appoint an auditor to review and certify
their financial statements. The auditor's role in corporate gover-
nance is to ensure a greater degree of accountability of manage-
ment to shareholders.' The auditor's role is to review the financial
statements prepared by a company's management. The primary pur-
pose of the auditor is to bridge the information and credibility gaps
that exist between top corporate management and stakeholders such
as shareholders, potential investors and creditors, who are finan-
cially interested in the capital controlled by such management. The
rationale for imposing personal liability on gatekeepers such as
auditors is that they have an opportunity to catch misconduct or
prevent issuer companies from engaging in misconduct before actual
harm is caused in the marketplace.
In order to give meaning to the auditor's role as an objective
third-party scrutineer, an auditor's independence from her clients
is one of the hallmarks of the accounting profession.9 Independence
ensures that the auditor will be objective when obtaining, reviewing
and reporting client information. Canadian corporate law attempts
to give the principle of auditor independence bite by requiring, for
example, that:
(i) the auditor is independent from the corporation; 0
(ii) the shareholders, not management, have the legal authority
to appoint the auditor at the annual general meeting;"
(iii) the auditor must report on the financial statements before
the shareholders at the annual general meeting; 2
(iv) the auditor can demand all relevant information and access
8. See Pur, supra, footnote 6, for an in-depth discussion of this issue.
9. Ibid.
10. CBCA, s. 161(1) and (2).
11. CBCA, S. 162(1).
12. CBCA, s. 171(7) and (8).
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to documents necessary to enable her to make the examina-
tion; 3 and
(v) if the management removes the auditor or if the auditor
resigns, the former auditor is entitled to speak at the next
annual general meeting to disclose to shareholders and the
new auditor the reasons for disagreement and the termina-
tion of the relationship. 14
Despite the presence of these safeguards in corporate and securi-
ties law statutes, the practical reality of the role of the auditor in
corporate governance in Canada has been starkly different. Al-
though auditors are officially appointed by the shareholders, the
management of publicly held corporations selects the auditor.
Shareholders have little or no input in the matter, in the same way
that shareholders have little or no input in the composition of the
slate of the board of directors. Auditors work closely with and are
paid by management, not shareholders. Based on this close work-
ing relationship, management may also provide auditors with lu-
crative contracts with respect to their non-auditing services. These
factors bring into question the degree of independence of auditors.
Auditors have also been reluctant to report on perceived manage-
ment misconduct because they did not want to be known as the
whistleblowers in the corporate community.
II. LIABILITY CRISIS
In the context of a healthy, robust economy, the end of the
twentieth century witnessed increased concern about the personal
liability that was being placed on directors and officers, as well
as gatekeepers such as lawyers, underwriters and, most notably,
auditors. This concern overlay a broader perception that share-
holder or investor litigation was misused or, at a minimum, over-
used. There were concerns about a liability crisis, an insurance
crisis, and the strategic search for deep pocket defendants. There
were also concerns about a flood of strike suits, multi-million
dollar class actions, and frivolous and vexatious lawsuits being
filed.' 5 Overall, there was a view that personal liability for corporate
13. CBCA, s. 168(1).
14. CBCA, S. 168(2).
15. It was claimed that by 1994, at least $1.3 billion of unresolved claims were pending
against Canadian accountants. This represented a substantial increase in a short period
of time. See Gundi Jeffrey, "Accountants Want Relief from Legal Nightmare", The
Financial Post (April 29, 1994), p. 12.
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management and gatekeepers was too broad and that the threat of
shareholder litigation was an ineffective or too-blunt tool for ensur-
ing accountability of management to shareholders.
The response to the so-called liability crisis came from three
fronts in Canada: (i) judicial narrowing of the auditor's duty of
care, (ii) the rise of limited liability partnerships, and (iii) the
introduction of a proportionate liability scheme under the CBCA.
All three responses can be traced to strenuous efforts mounted
by the accounting profession, often with little input from other
stakeholders, which we will refer to as outsiders.
The judiciary in Canada actively narrowed the auditor's duty of
care. In particular, in 1997 in Hercules Management Ltd. v. Ernst &
Young16 the Supreme Court of Canada constricted the scope of the
duty of care owed by auditors to shareholders and other users of
audited financial statements. The plaintiffs were shareholders in
Northguard Acceptance Ltd. and Northguard Holdings Ltd., compa-
nies engaged in commercial and real estate lending. Ernst & Young
was the Northguard companies' auditor. In 1984, both Northguard
companies went into receivership and a suit was brought claiming
that the shareholder plaintiff relied on the 1980-82 auditor reports,
which were prepared negligently. The shareholder was unsuccessful
in this action. The court acknowledged that there were reasonable
arguments in favour of broad auditor liability, but then went on to
give more weight to the policy considerations in favour of limiting
auditor liability. The court reasoned that a shareholder could not
bring an action against an auditor for reliance on audited financial
statements for the purpose of making personal investment decisions
when the purpose of the audit was to oversee the corporation's
management, not to assist individual shareholders. At the forefront
of the court's mind was the concern for "liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class". 17
16. [1997] 2 S.C.R. 165, 146 D.L.R. (4th) 577
17. Ibid., at p. 188. For a detailed discussion of this case and the limitation of the duty of
care owed by auditors, see Janne Chung, Poonam Pur and Linda Thorne, "Auditor's
Duty of Care" (March 2003) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors); Robert
Hollyman, "Hercules Managements and the Duty of Care in Negligent Misstatement:
How Dispensable is Reliance?" (2001), 34 U.B.C. L. Rev. 515; Blackier and Paskell-
Mede, supra, footnote 4; and L. Khoury, "The Liability of Auditors beyond Their
Clients: A Comparative Study" (2001), 46 McGill L.J. 413.
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The second notable development in response to the liability
crisis in Canada has been the advent of limited liability partner-
ships (LLPs)."8 Prior to the development of LLPS, accountants and
other professionals practicing in partnerships in Canada were per-
sonally liable for the negligence of their partners. LLP legislation
was first enacted in the United States in the late 1980s and early
1990s as a result of the savings and loan crisis.19 In Canada, LLP
legislation was first enacted in Ontario in 1998,20 followed by other
provinces in subsequent years. LLPs limit the liability of profession-
als who practice in partnerships such that a partner in, for example,
an accounting firm carried on as a LLP is no longer personally
liable for the negligence of his or her co-partners.2" The partner still
remains personally liable for his or her own negligence as well as
that of anyone under his or her supervision or control.22
The third and most recent development that has reduced the
scope of auditor liability is a move away from joint and several
liability to proportionate liability under the CBCA. The perception
of many in the accounting profession was that the introduction of
LLPS protected individual non-negligent partners of an accounting
firm but did not help the firm itself.23 Proportionate liability was first
introduced in the United States in 1995 as part of securities law
reform.24 This development led the Canadian accounting profession
to actively push for similar legislation.25
The 2001 CBCA amendments that came into force on November
24, 2002 changed the regime of joint and several liability among co-
defendants to a modified proportionate liability regime. In short, a
defendant who is found responsible for a financial loss that arises
18. See Poonam Puri, "Judgment Proofing the Profession" (2002), 15 Geo. J. Legal Ethics
1 for a discussion of the rise of limited liability partnerships in Canada.
19. All 50 states have modified their partnership statutes to permit general partnerships to
register as LLPs. See J. William Callsion and Allan W. Vestal, "They've Created a Lamb
with Mandibles of Death: Secrecy, Disclosure, and Fiduciary Duties in Limited Liability
Firms" (2002), 76 Ind. L.J. 271 at p. 313, note 2, as cited in Puri, ibid., at p. 2.
20. In Ontario, the Partnerships Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.5, amended by S.O. 1998, c. 2,
permitted LLPs.
21. Puri, supra, footnote 18, at p. 2.
22. Ibid.
23. W. Gray and C.W Halladay, Guide to CBCA Reform: Analysis and Precedents (Toronto,
Carswell, 2002), p. 62.
24. Coffee, supra, footnote 7.
25. See for example Duncan Green, "Litigation Risk for Auditors and the Risk Society"
(1999), 10 Critical Perp. Acct. 339. One commentator describes the amendments as a
"testimonial to the great strength of the audit lobby in Canada": W. Gray and C.W.
Halladay, supra, footnote 23, at p. 62.
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out of an error, omission or misstatement in financial information
that is required by the CBCA is liable to the plaintiff only for the
portion of damages corresponding to the defendant's degree of lia-
bility.26 The new proportionate liability scheme is limited in several
ways. First, the 2001 amendments only apply to misconduct in
relation to the CBCA, and accordingly not to securities law
breaches.27 Secondly, joint and several liability continues to apply in
cases of fraud.28 Furthermore, in situations where one of the defen-
dants (such as the issuer company) is insolvent or unavailable, there
is provision for the court to apportion that defendant's liability to
the other co-defendants up to a cap equal to 50% of the amount
originally awarded against the co-defendant. 29 As well, certain "un-
sophisticated" plaintiffs are excluded from this regime, including
Crown corporations, certain charitable organizations, unsecured
trade creditors in respect of goods and services that the creditor
provided to the corporation,30 and individual plaintiffs whose invest-
ment is less than $20,000. 31 Such unsophisticated plaintiffs, or so-
phisticated plaintiffs who make small investments, can continue to
collect under the joint and several liability regime. Finally, courts
are left with the option to award joint and several liability where it
is just and reasonable to do so.
32
The benefits of proportionate liability are not limited to auditors.
Corporations, officers, directors, lawyers and other co-defendants
can take advantage of this new liability scheme. However, as with
the introduction of LLPS in Canada, the accounting profession was
the driving force behind the introduction of this set of changes to
the CBCA.33 The dominant argument in favour of the changes made
by the accounting profession was that joint and several liability was
unfair. For example, under a regime of joint and several liability,
auditors complained that they might have only been responsible for
5% of the plaintiff's losses, but ended up paying out 100% of the
26. CBCA, s. 237.3(1).
27. CBCA, s. 237.1.
28. CBCA, s. 237.4(1).
29. CBCA, s. 273.3(4).
30. CBCA, s. 237.2(2).
31. CBCA, s. 237.5(1).
32. CBCA, s. 237.5(2).
33. The Estey Brief on the liability facing the audit profession was the driving force behind
both the implementation of LLPS in Canada and the proportionate liability in the CBCA:
The Hon. W.Z. Estey, Q.C., "Proportionate Liability and Canadian Auditors", Brief
Prepared for Legal Liability Task Force, Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants
(January 23, 1996). See also W. Gray and C.W. Halladay, supra, footnote 23, at p. 62.
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damages because the issuer company, which was 95% responsible,
was insolvent at the time of the action. The Report of the Standing
Committee on Banking Trade and Commerce on Joint and Several
Liability and Professional Defendants, chaired by the Honourable
Michael Kirby, set out this concern as follows:
The principal argument against maintaining joint and several liability is also
based on fairness - fairness to the defendants. It is argued that it is unfair
that a defendant whose degree of fault is minor when compared to that of
other defendants should have to fully compensate a plaintiff if the other
defendants are insolvent. In theory, the less blameworthy defendants can
recover from the more blameworthy defendants; in practise, however the
former, particularly where they are insured professionals, are left to bear the
lion's share of liability when other defendants are insolvent or have disap-
peared. 14
The introduction of the new proportionate liability scheme is
fraught with difficulties. It is beyond the scope of this article to
dwell upon the issues of drafting and judicial resources that will
be expended to interpret the amendments, or the potential unconsti-
tutional encroachment on the powers of the provinces to legislate
on this matter.
However, we do question the preferential treatment that Crown
and charitable organizations receive under the scheme, given that
the former certainly cannot qualify as an unsophisticated investor
and the latter is a heterogeneous class of organizations of varying
levels of sophistication. We also wonder why $20,000 was chosen
as the threshold beyond which an individual investor would be
denied joint and several recovery against defendants. Finally, we
are concerned that the long-awaited statutory civil liability scheme
for continuous disclosure violations that has been proposed in
Ontario by way of amendments to the Securities Act contains its
own proportionate liability scheme that operates on an entirely
different basis from that in the CBCA.35 It would have been judicious
to achieve some level of harmonization, or at least consistency, on
this important liability issue.
Most significant to this article are concerns relating to process
and the current climate for a new proportionate liability scheme.
In a manner reminiscent of the introduction of LLPS in Canada,36
34. Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Joint and Several
Liability and Professional Defendants (March 1998), at p. 2.
35. See infra, footnotes 52 to 57 and accompanying text.
36. Puri, supra, footnote 18.
[Vol. 39
2003] Canadian Auditors in the Wrong Place at the Wrong Time? 45
there was a lack of meaningful debate from the perspectives of the
multiple stakeholders affected by the changes to the CBCA. Members
of the accounting/auditing profession made submissions to the
Standing Committee on Trade Commerce and Finance, but there
was a lack of representation on the part of investors/shareholders of
corporations. Perhaps if there had been more debate and a more
inclusive process we would not be in the situation that we are in
today where: (i) we have legislation that is inconsistent with the
current economic climate, and (ii) a number of North American
corporate governance scandals have surfaced which have at their
root accounting problems and problems with the role of the auditor
as gatekeeper.
III. AUDITOR LIABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CLIMATE
In our view, the narrowing of the scope of auditors' liability is
not a positive development for corporate governance. The threat
of shareholder litigation acts both as an incentive for managers to
remain accountable to investors and for gatekeepers to perform
their gatekeeping function effectively. We believe that the response
to the so-called liability crisis, which resulted in a reduction of
auditor liability on many fronts, has assisted in creating an environ-
ment in which auditors have not performed their gatekeeping
function effectively, have been lax about their conflicts of interest,
have succumbed to management pressure to approve financial
documents in a certain way, and overall have not performed their
jobs of being independent scrutineers of financial documents pre-
pared by management. Evidence and support for these claims
come from recent incidents south of the border.
It is clear that misleading and fraudulent accounting practices
and policies were at the heart of the recent American corporate
scandals. It is difficult to separate the role and responsibility of
the auditor from that of management in financial matters unless
management clearly withheld information from the auditors. John
Coffee argues that Enron must be viewed as evidence of systematic
governance failure in the United States, due in large part to the
changing status of the auditor gatekeeper.37 The story of the decline
of auditor liability in the United States in the 1990s, combined with
37. Coffee, supra, footnote 7.
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the increased incentives to defer to management (such as lucrative
consulting contracts), can be easily mapped on to a similar story in
the Canadian context, albeit at a slower pace. Coffee points to
judicial and legislative change in the United States in the 1990s,
which collectively reduced the liability of auditors, and the onset of
the Big Five accounting firms using their audit function principally
to cross-sell lucrative consulting services.38
Today, as a result of the recent corporate governance scandals,
we have seen and continue to see an expansion of liability as a
governance tool in both Canada and the United States. In particu-
lar, there has been and will continue to be a tightening of rules
under which the auditor operates as a gatekeeper to the securities
markets. The actual and anticipated regulatory response in Canada
and the United States has focused on personal liability for top
management through the use of CEO/CFO certification of financial
disclosure; increased independence of directors on corporate boards;
changes to the composition, role and responsibilities of audit com-
mittees; and a restructuring of the relationship between auditors and
corporate managers.
In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has adopted final rules under Title II of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 200219 that impose new independence requirements for ac-
counting firms conducting audits of a reporting company's financial
statements.n0 The new rules, effective May 6, 2003, provide a num-
ber of provisions that address issues relating to the role and perfor-
mance of auditors. In particular, sox restricts the services that
auditors can provide contemporaneously with the audit.4' Any per-
mitted non-audit services must be approved in advance by the audit
38. Coffee, ibid.
39. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (hereafter sox).
40. SEC Release Nos. 33-8183; 34-47265; 35-27642; Ic-25915; IA-2103; FR-68 (January
28, 2003). See <http://www.sec.gov/rules/final.html> (accessed March 16, 2003). We
recognize that the independence rules adopted by the SEC are not just the concern of
auditors; however, we limit our comments to the confines of this article concerning
auditor liability. If there is an independence problem it will have serious liability
consequences not just for the auditor but for the audit committee that approves the
services, the CEO or CFO who will be required to certify the services, and the company
more generally. Pursuant to s. 302 of sox, the SEC is required to adopt rules that require
CEOs or CFOs to certify the: (i) fairness of presentation of the company's financial
statements, (ii) adequacy of the company's internal controls and (iii) adequacy of the
company's disclosure controls and procedures.
41. Pursuant to SOX, s. 201:
An auditor of a public company that performs any audit will be prohibited from
providing any non-audit services, including:
a. Bookkeeping services;
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committee of the audit client.42 The lead audit partner, or the audit
partner responsible for reviewing the audit, must be rotated at least
every five years. 43 A public accounting firm cannot provide services
to an issuer if certain officers of the company were employed by the
accounting firm in the year prior to the audit.'
The SEC has also adopted final rules under s. 802 of Sox that
require an accounting firm to retain its records for a period of seven
years following the completion of an audit or review of a reporting
company's financial statements. 45 Notably, the SEC has adopted a
separate rule under s. 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
that not only makes it unlawful for an auditor not to be independent
under the relevant sox rules but also opens auditors up to additional
liability under the 1934 statute. 4
Unlike the situation in the United States, in Canada jurisdiction
over securities law is fragmented, with multiple regulatory bodies
involved in the process of reform without real harmonization. A
vigorous debate has been taking place among Canadian securities
regulators and stock exchanges on what a made-in-Canada corpo-
rate governance solution should look like.47 Some regulators, such
as the British Columbia Securities Commission, have suggested that
the newly heightened U.S. rules present a competitive opportunity
for attracting companies to Canada, while other regulators such as
the Ontario Securities Commission (osc) fear capital flight if our
standards are not raised to U.S. levels.48 The osc's argument is that
there is no quick profit to be made from failing to protect investors,
b. Financial Information systems design and implementation;
c. Appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution in kind reports;
d. Actuarial services;
e. Internal audit outsourcing services;
f. Management functions or human resources;
g. Broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services;
h. Legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit; and
i. Any other services that the PCAOB determines is impermissible.
42. sox, s. 202.
43. sox, s. 203.
44. sox, s. 206.
45. SEC Release Nos. 33-8180; 34-47241; IC-25911; FR-66 (January 24, 2003). The rules
under s. 802 of sox are effective March 3, 2003.
46. 17 CFR 240.10A-2.
47. In the fall of 2002, osC Chair David Brown invited market participants to engage in a
debate on an appropriate regulatory response. See, for example, response letter of
Barbara Stymiest, CEO of the TSX, to David Brown, Chair of the Ontario Securities
Commission (September 17, 2002), available at <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/HotTop-
ics/prom inv conf.html#expanded>.
48. See letter of Barbara Stymiest, ibid.
48 Canadian Business Law Journal
with the downside being a decline in the ability to attract capital to
Canada. It may be that the made-in-Canada response that is currently
being tailored may involve only the osc and Toronto Stock Ex-
change (TSx) adopting modified versions of the American reforms,
while other provincial securities regulators and the TSX Venture
Exchange stay put with their existing levels of regulation.
In addition to the regulatory efforts from within the accounting
profession and the formation of the CPAB, discussed earlier, we
focus below on the response from the Ontario Securities Commis-
sion and the TSX,49 which the osc oversees in its role of supervising
regulatory organizations and recognized exchanges. 0
On October 30, 2002 the Ontario Minister of Finance, as part of
the Government's Fall 2002 Budget Bill, introduced proposed
amendments to the Ontario Securities Act. The proposed amend-
ments are included in Bill 198, Keeping the Promise for a Strong
Economy Act (Budget Measures), 2002. Bill 198 received Royal
Assent on December 9, 2002, and the changes to the OSA discussed
below have not yet been proclaimed into force.
Bill 198 creates express prohibitions against securities fraud,
market manipulation and making misleading or untrue state-
ments." Further, Bill 198 creates a statutory right of action for
investors in the secondary market to sue companies and other re-
sponsible persons for misrepresentations or failure to make timely
disclosure.52 This proposed civil liability scheme is based on draft
legislation previously published by the Canadian Securities Admin-
istrators, which arose out of the Toronto Stock Exchange Committee
on Corporate Disclosure's final report issued in March 1997.Y3 On-
tario is the first province to introduce the proposed legislation.
The new scheme for civil liability creates a right of action
against (i) the responsible issuer, (ii) the person making the public
49. The TSX Group operates two exchanges: the TSX itself and the TSX Venture Exchange.
Only the TSX is under the Ontario Securities Commission's regulatory jurisdiction. For
the purposes of this article we focus only on the TSX.
50. Pursuant to the Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (hereafter OSA), s. 21(2), the osc
may, on the application of a person or company proposing to carry on business as a
stock exchange in Ontario, recognize the person or company if the osc is satisfied that
to do so would be in the public interest. The TSX was recognized by the osc as a stock
exchange pursuant to Recognition Order 21-901.
51. OSA, ss. 126.1 and 126.2.
52. OSA, s. 138.13.
53. See CSA Notice 53-302, Proposalfor a Statutory Civil Remedy for Investors of Second-
ary Markets and Response to the Proposed Change to the Definitions of "Material
Fact" and "Material Change" (2000), 23 OSCB 7383.
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oral statement, (iii) each director or officer of the responsible
issuer, (iv) an influential person, (v) each director or officer of the
influential person, and (vi) each expert. "Expert" is defined to
include auditors.
Interestingly, Bill 198 adopts a proportionate liability scheme.
However, it differs from the one adopted under the CBCA. Similar
to the scheme under the CBCA, it limits the damages payable by a
defendant to the proportionate share of its responsibility for the
harm, up to caps that are specified in the legislation. However,
unlike the CBCA amendments, which allow certain plaintiffs to con-
tinue to use joint and several liability, this scheme permits all plain-
tiffs to recover on a joint and several basis from particularly
blameworthy defendants. Where a court determines that a particular
defendant knowingly authorized, permitted or acquiesced in the
making of the misrepresentation, or the failure to make timely dis-
closure, the whole amount of the damages assessed in the action
may be recovered from that defendant on a joint and several liability
basis.54
Under the scheme in Bill 198, the maximum liability for an
auditor would be limited to the greater of a million dollars and the
revenue that the auditor and any of its affiliates have earned from
the responsible issuer and its affiliates during the 12 months pre-
ceding the misrepresentation.55 As noted above, the liability limits
do not apply where the plaintiff proves that the auditor knowingly
authorized, permitted or acquiesced in the making of the misrepre-
sentation or the failure to make timely disclosure.56
In addition to Bill 198, the osc has been working with the TSX
Group,57 which operates the TSX, to develop new rules for public
companies listed on the TSX. The recently amended Ontario Securi-
ties Act also authorizes the osc to make rules on the composition,
role and responsibilities of the audit committee." On July 27, 2003,
54. OSA, s. 138.6(2).
55. The liability limit for each category of individual or person is specified in the definition
for "liability limit" under OSA s. 136.1.
56. OSA, s. 138.6(2).
57. Pursuant to OSA s. 21(5), the OSC may, if it appears to be in the public interest, make any
decision with respect to any by-law, rule, regulation, policy, procedure, interpretation or
practice of a recognized stock exchange.
58. See Notice of Request for Comments <www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Regulation/Rulemaking/
Rules/rule-52-108-20030627-Clnotice-roc.pdf> (accessed August 29, 2003) (hereafter
Multilateral Instruments). The TSX has also released Proposed Amended TSX Corporate
Disclosure Guidelines, which are currently under consideration by the oSc and not in
force. However, these guidelines are weaker than the Multilateral Instruments. See
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the osc published for a 90-day comment period Multilateral Instru-
ments 52-108 (Auditor oversight), 52-109 (Certification of Disclo-
sure in Companies' Annual and Interim Filing). The guidelines
currently in force can be found in the Toronto Stock Exchange
Company Manual.59
Currently, the TSX Manual provides that the board of directors
should adopt a charter for the audit committee that sets out the roles
and responsibilities of the committee so as to provide guidance
to the committee members as to their duties.' The Multilateral
Instruments would go further to require that all of the TSX's listed
issuers have an audit committee with a proper charter.61 Currently,
the TSX Manual recommends that an audit committee be composed
of only unrelated directors.62 The Multilateral Instruments would
make it a requirement that audit committees are composed of inde-
pendent directors.63 The Multilateral Instruments would also require
that all members of audit committees be financially literate.64 The
Multilateral Instruments are fueled by the recognition that audit
committees exist primarily to enhance the external auditor's inde-
pendence.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have made the case that despite recent amendments to the
CBCA implementing a proportionate liability scheme that will apply
to auditors, in the future auditors will be losers when it comes to
limiting their liability through statutory and judicial mechanisms.
This article has mapped the Canadian pattern of reducing auditor
liability through judicial pronouncements narrowing the scope of
their duty of care, the creation of LLPs and the introduction of
proportionate liability. We have suggested that a similar pattern
unfolded in the United States, albeit at a faster pace, such that
Canada did not fully experience the negative impact these changes
had on the auditor gatekeeping function.
<www.tsx.com/en/pdf/Brownlet-attachment-CorpGovProposals.pdf> (accessed March
24, 2003).
59. <www.tsx.com> (accessed August 29, 2003) (hereafter TSX Manual).
60. TSX Manual, ibid., s. 473(13).
61. Multilateral Instrument 52-108, part 2.
62. TSX Manual, supra, footnote 59, s. 473(13).
63. Multilateral Instrument 52-108, part 3.1(3).
64. Multilateral Instrument 52-108, part 3.1(4).
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At the same time, by illustrating the extent to which Canadian
federal and provincial regulators have focused on auditors and
their role as gatekeepers to prevent an Enron in Canada, this article
has illustrated the pivotal role that auditors and audit committees
have in preserving investor confidence in the post-Enron era. This
may be a role that auditors can capitalize on in Canada, but only if
they truly understand the nature of their potential liability in the
future. In the United States, Enron was a landmark event, not in
the nature of the corporate practices that were exposed, but in
terms of the significant legislative changes and the new rules
adopted by the SEC, all relating to and creating a renewed interest in
the role of auditors. In Canada, auditors have the benefit of this
reaction from regulators and legislatures ex ante, better equipping
them for taking on the task of playing a renewed pivotal role in
investor confidence at a time when all stakeholders are taking corpo-
rate governance seriously.
